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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 19-62408-CIV-SINGHAL/VALLE
PHILIPPE CALDERON, ANCIZAR MARIN,
and AMIR CHARNIS, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SIXT RENT A CAR, LLC,
Defendant.
_______________________________________/
ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant Sixt Rent a Car, LLC’s Motion to
Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff Amir Charnis’s Claims, to Stay His Claims, and for Oral
Argument (“Motion to Compel”) (DE [101]). Plaintiff Charnis has filed a Response in
Opposition (DE [106]), and Sixt has filed a Reply (DE [115]).

The Court has also

considered all the attachments submitted in support of the parties’ positions. For the
reasons discussed below, the Court grants Sixt’s Motion to Compel.
I.

BACKGROUND
This putative class action arises out of allegedly unauthorized fees and costs

imposed by Sixt, a luxury rental-car company, after Plaintiffs each rented cars from it.1
First Am. Compl. ¶ 1 (DE [74]). Plaintiffs allege that Sixt “organized a company-wide
scheme to systematically charge unfair, deceptive, and unauthorized repair fees to

On February 12, 2020, this Court denied Sixt’s Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff Marin’s claims,
(DE [30]), which Sixt has appealed, (DE [44]). The appeal has not yet been decided. Plaintiffs Calderon
and Marin were later granted leave to amend their original complaint to add Charnis as Plaintiff. See
(DE [73], [74]). This Motion involves only Charnis’s claims.
1
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customers in order to increase revenue.” Id. ¶ 3. Charnis and Sixt provide different
accounts of how the events unfolded in this case.2
A. Allegations of the First Amended Complaint
Sixt asserts that its rental agreement with Charnis consists of two separate
documents that constitute the entire agreement: the Face Page and the Rental Jacket.
First Am. Compl. ¶ 23 (DE [74]); see also Ex. G to First Am. Compl. (DE [74-7]) (Face
Page). Charnis alleges that the customer signs the Face Page at a Sixt kiosk when
picking up the rental. First Am. Compl. ¶ 25 (DE [74]). The Face Page includes language
that Sixt asserts is an incorporation by reference of the Rental Jacket: “By signing below,
you agree to the Terms and Conditions printed on the Rental Jacket and to the terms
found on this Face Page, which together constitute this Agreement.” Id. ¶ 29. The Rental
Jacket is a tri-fold pamphlet that includes the same material terms used by Sixt at all
locations across the United States. Id. ¶ 28; see also Ex. C to First Am. Compl. (DE [743]) (Rental Jacket). The version of the Rental Jacket attached to the First Amended
Complaint does not appear to contain an arbitration provision.
Sixt allegedly imposed two categories of unauthorized fees on its customers: (1)
fees authorized only by the Rental Jacket; and (2) fees authorized by neither the Rental
Jacket nor the Face Page. See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26–27, 29, 40 (DE [74]). The only
authorized fees, Charnis alleges, are those included in the Face Page. See id. ¶ 26.
Charnis alleges that Sixt did not provide him instructions on how to access the Rental
Jacket before signing the Face Page. Id. ¶ 27; see also id. ¶¶ 32–33. According to

In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the Court applies “a summary judgment-like standard” and
“may conclude as a matter of law that [the] parties did or did not enter into an arbitration agreement only if
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact concerning the formation of such an agreement.” Mason
v. Midland Funding LLC, 815 F. App’x 320, 328 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bazemore v. Jefferson Capital
Sys., LLC, 827 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016)).
2

2
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Charnis, the Rental Jacket is not provided to customers until after they sign the Face
Page. Id. ¶¶ 30, 35. Charnis also alleges that Sixt does not provide any instructions on
its website on how to access the Rental Jacket when making an online reservation. Id. ¶
30.
Turning to Charnis’s specific rental, he reserved a rental car through Sixt’s website,
www.sixt.com, on November 17, 2019. Id. ¶ 115. Charnis did not pay for the rental at
that time, and it was freely cancelable. Id. The confirmation email reflected merely an
“estimated price.” Id. ¶¶ 115, 117. Charnis contends that he did not agree to any of the
terms in the Rental Jacket when he made his reservation. Id. ¶ 35.
Three days later, Charnis picked up the car from the Sixt kiosk at the Miami
International Airport. See id. ¶ 119; Ex. G to First Am. Compl. (DE [74-7]). He was asked
to electronically sign acceptance of the Face Page. First Am. Compl. ¶ 120 (DE [74]).
He alleges that at no point before signing was he “presented with, provided the
opportunity to review, or given instructions on how to access the Sixt Rental Jacket.” Id.
¶ 121; see also id. ¶¶ 124, 126. After Charnis electronically signed, the Face Page was
printed, folded, and placed in a folded paper envelope, which was the Rental Jacket that
contained additional terms and conditions unknown to Charnis. Id. ¶ 122. Charnis alleges
that, “[o]n information and belief,” the Rental Jacket did not include an arbitration provision
when he signed the Face Page, id. ¶ 31, nor was his online reservation subject to an
arbitration provision, id. ¶ 116.
Charnis returned his car on November 25, 2019; he maintains that it sustained no
damage and was in the same condition as when he picked it up. Id. ¶ 128. Sixt did not
inspect the car for damage at that time. Id. ¶ 129. But on December 9, 2019, Charnis
received a letter from Sixt indicating that the rental sustained damage while in his
3
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possession and required him to pay $519 in fees, consisting of $361.20 in estimate of
repair; $90.30 in diminution of value; $45 in administrative fees; and $22.50 in
estimate/appraisal fees. Id. ¶ 130; see also Ex. H to First Am. Compl. (DE [74-8])
(invoice). Charnis denied causing any damage to the car but submitted the invoice to his
independent insurance company, ultimately paying Sixt $361.20 through his insurance
for the estimate of repair. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 131–33 (DE [74]). Charnis alleges that
the diminution of value and administrative fees were authorized only by the Rental Jacket,
not the Face Page. Id. ¶ 135. The estimate of repair and estimate/appraisal fee were
allegedly authorized neither by the Rental Jacket nor by the Face Page. Id. Nevertheless,
Charnis paid the remaining balance of $157.80 to avoid harm to his credit. Id. ¶ 142.
Charnis and the other named Plaintiffs filed this putative class action alleging five
counts: (I) breach of contract (on behalf of the unauthorized-fee class and the Florida
Consumer Collections Practices Act (“FCCPA”) subclass); (II) violation of Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”) on behalf of the unauthorized-fee
class and the FCCPA subclass; (III) violation of the FCCPA on behalf of the FCCPA
subclass; (IV) breach of contract on behalf of the non-repair class, pleaded in the
alternative to counts I through III; and (V) violation of FDUTPA on behalf of the passthrough fee class, pleaded in the alternative to counts I through III.
B. Facts in Sixt’s Motion to Compel Arbitration
Sixt explains the facts differently. In support of its Motion to Compel, Sixt submits
three declarations of Dennis Boehringer, its director of corporate development. See 1st
Boehringer Decl. (DE [102]); 2d Boehringer Decl. (DE [104]); 3d Boehringer Decl.
(DE [116]). Boehringer attests that he is familiar with the reservation booking process on
Sixt’s website, and he made several reservations in November 2019 to test the process.
4
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1st Boehringer Decl. ¶ 5 (DE [102]); 3d Boehringer Decl. ¶ 2 (DE [116]). He explains the
booking process as follows: Customers choose a vehicle and input their personal
information. 1st Boehringer Decl. ¶¶ 6–7 (DE [102]). Before completing the online
reservation, customers are required to click the “BOOK NOW” button that confirms that
they have “read and accepted the rental information and the terms and conditions.” Id.
¶¶ 7–8. The phrases “rental information” and “terms and conditions” are hyperlinked in
orange against a white background:

Id. ¶ 8. Clicking on the “terms and conditions” hyperlink displays the general Rental
Jacket. Id. ¶ 7; see also Ex. 1 to 1st Boehringer Decl. (DE [102-1]) (Rental Jacket); 3d
Boehringer Decl. ¶¶ 4–5 (DE [116]).
The version of the general Rental Jacket in effect in November 2019 contains an
arbitration provision:
16. Arbitration Agreement and Class Action Waiver. YOU AND SIXT EACH
WAIVE THEIR RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL OR TO PARTICIPATE IN A
CLASS ACTION PURSUANT TO THE FOLLOWING TERMS. YOU AND
SIXT AGREE TO ARBITRATE ANY AND ALL CLAIMS,
CONTROVERSIES OR DISPUTES OF ANY KIND (“CLAIMS”) AGAINST
EACH OTHER, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO CLAIMS ARISING
OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT, OR OUR PRODUCTS
AND SERVICES, CHARGES, ADVERTISINGS, OR RENTAL VEHICLES
INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION CLAIMS BASED ON CONTRACT,
TORT (INCLUDING INTENTIONAL TORTS), FRAUD, AGENCY,
NEGLIGENCE, STATUTORY OR REGULATORY PROVISIONS OR ANY
OTHER SOURCE OF LAW. THE ARBITRATOR, AND NOT ANY
FEDERAL, STATE OR LOCAL COURT OR AGENCY, SHALL HAVE
AUTHORITY TO RESOLVE ANY AND ALL DISPUTES RELATING TO
5
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THE INTERPRETATION, APPLICABILITY, ENFORCEABILITY OR
FORMATION OF THIS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
ANY CLAIM THAT ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS AGREEMENT IS VOID
OR VOIDABLE. . . .
Ex. 1 to 1st Boehringer Decl. (DE [102-1], at 21).
Boehringer also attests that in November 2019, Sixt’s new checkout (pick-up)
process was in effect at the Miami location. 1st Boehringer Decl. ¶¶ 12, 17–18 (DE [102]).
Customers are provided details about their rental and receive disclosures on a
touchscreen tablet, to which they must agree. Id. ¶ 13. Next, customers advance to a
screen entitled “ACKNOWLEDGMENT CONTRACT CONDITIONS”:

Id. ¶ 17. The hyperlinked “terms and conditions”—to which customers must also agree—
leads to a copy of the general Rental Jacket when selected. Id. ¶ 15; see also 3d
Boehringer Decl. ¶ 7 (DE [116]). Customers cannot proceed any further until they have
agreed to all the terms and conditions. 1st Boehringer Decl. ¶ 15 (DE [102]). After
agreeing to the terms and conditions, customers pay for the rental. Id. ¶ 16. Customers

6
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sign their name on the touchscreen and hit “DONE” to complete the transaction. Id.; see
also 3d Boehringer Decl. ¶ 8 (DE [116]).
In November 2019, each customer received (1) a printed copy of the terms and
conditions at the rental counter and (2) a copy of the Face Page via email or printed,
based on the customer’s choice. See 1st Boehringer Decl. ¶ 18 (DE [102]); 3d Boehringer
Decl. ¶ 8 (DE [116]). The printed copy of the Florida Rental Jacket is the same as the
electronic copy available when customers click on the hyperlink at the kiosk before
accepting the terms and conditions. See 1st Boehringer Decl. ¶ 36 (DE [102]); 3d
Boehringer Decl. ¶ 9 (DE [116]); Ex. 9 to 1st Boehringer Decl. (DE [102-9]) (Florida Rental
Jacket).
As to Charnis’s specific reservation, Boehringer attests that, based on his
“personal and professional observations and participation in making reservations” in
November 2019, Charnis’s experience in reserving his Florida rental “would have been
identical” to the reservation process Boehringer described, 1st Boehringer Decl. ¶ 34
(DE [102]), and Charnis did, in fact, use the new checkout process that required him to
agree to the Rental Jacket terms and conditions before picking up the car, id. ¶¶ 35–36;
see also 3d Boehringer Decl. ¶ 10 (DE [116]).

Attached to Boehringer’s second

declaration is a copy of the Florida Rental Jacket in effect in November 2019, which
Charnis would have been able to view via hyperlink and of which he would have received
a paper copy. See 1st Boehringer Decl. ¶ 36 (DE [102]); Ex. 9 to 1st Boehringer Decl.
(DE [102-9]). The Florida Rental Jacket also contains an arbitration provision. See Ex.
9 to 1st Boehringer Decl. (DE [102-9], at 10). Boehringer also attaches a copy of
Charnis’s Face Page, which includes language referring to the “Terms and Conditions
printed on the rental jacket.” Ex. 1 to 2d Boehringer Decl. (DE [104-1], at 3). Sixt now
7
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moves to compel arbitration based on the provisions in the Rental Jacket and Face Page.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
“The Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., governs the enforceability

of an arbitration agreement.” Capua v. Air Europa Lineas Aereas S.A. Inc., 2021 WL
965500, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2021). An arbitration agreement is generally “valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA “establishes that, as a matter of
federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration.” Dasher v. RBC Bank (USA), 745 F.3d 1111, 1115 (11th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25
(1983)). But because “arbitration is simply a matter of contract,” the Court should apply
state-law contract principles to determine whether the parties intended to submit to
arbitration. Id. at 1116 (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943
(1995)).
Thus, the presumption favoring arbitrability “does not apply to disputes concerning
whether an agreement to arbitrate has been made.” Id. (quoting Applied Energetics, Inc.
v. NewOak Capital Mkts., LLC, 645 F.3d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 2011)); see also AT&T Techs.,
Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (“Arbitration is a matter of
contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has
not agreed so to submit.” (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960))).
III.

DISCUSSION
The Court will address Sixt’s arguments in four parts: (A) whether the delegation

clause precludes the Court from analyzing formation of the contract; (B) whether the
California rental documents are relevant at this stage of the litigation; (C) whether the
8
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parties agreed to arbitrate; and (D) whether questions of arbitrability must be delegated.
A. The Delegation Clause Does Not End the Analysis on This Motion.
First, Sixt argues that the Court should compel arbitration of Charnis’s claims
because the general and Florida Rental Jackets contain a valid delegation clause within
the arbitration provision, which “ends the analysis” of the Motion to Compel. Mot. to
Compel 16 (DE [101]). It is true that the general Rental Jacket provides that gateway
questions of “interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation” of the agreement
shall be decided by the arbitrator, not the Court. See Ex. 1 to 1st Boehringer Decl.
(DE [102-1], at 21). Such delegation provisions are enforceable by the Court. See Henry
Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 529 (2019) (“Applying the
[FAA], we have held that parties may agree to have an arbitrator decide not only the
merits of a particular dispute but also ‘gateway’ questions of ‘arbitrability,’ such as whether
the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular
controversy.” (quoting Rent–A–Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68–69 (2010)));
Jones v. Waffle House, Inc., 866 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he parties may
agree to arbitrate gateway questions of arbitrability including the enforceability, scope,
applicability, and interpretation of the arbitration agreement.” (citing Rent–A–Center, 561
U.S. at 68–69)).
But “[a]rbitration is a matter of contract and of consent.” JPay, Inc. v. Kobel, 904
F.3d 923, 928 (11th Cir. 2018). “[A]rbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes
only because the parties have agreed in advance to submit such grievances to
arbitration.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 648–49). Where,
like here, the parties disagree about whether they entered into a binding contract in the
first place, the Court must determine the threshold question of whether the parties agreed
9
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to submit their dispute—even the arbitrability issues—to the arbitrator. See Henry Schein,
139 S. Ct. at 530 (“To be sure, before referring a dispute to an arbitrator, the court
determines whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. See 9 U.S.C. § 2. But if a valid
agreement exists, and if the agreement delegates the arbitrability issue to an arbitrator, a
court may not decide the arbitrability issue.”); Wiand v. Schneiderman, 778 F.3d 917, 924
(11th Cir. 2015) (“[C]hallenges to the validity of the arbitration clause in particular or to
the very existence of the contract must be resolved by the court before deciding a motion
to compel arbitration.” (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440,
444–45 n.1 (2006))).
Here, Charnis is not simply challenging the validity or enforceability of the
arbitration provision; he is disputing that he ever entered into a contract. Thus, the Court
agrees with Charnis that it must determine the question of contract formation before
reaching the delegation clause in the arbitration provision. See, e.g., Plazas Rocha v.
Telemundo Network Grp. LLC, 2020 WL 6679190, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2020)
(“[W]here the parties dispute whether an agreement to arbitrate exists at all, the Court
must begin by making a threshold determination as to whether a contract has been
formed before assessing any delegation clause.”); Bell v. Royal Seas Cruises, Inc., 2020
WL 5742189, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May 13, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020
WL 5639947 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2020) (“[I]t is clear that the Court, not an arbitrator,
should decide whether the parties entered into the arbitration agreement in the first
instance.”).
B. The California Rentals Have No Bearing on This Motion.
Next, Sixt argues that this Court has no authority to determine whether the parties
entered into an arbitration agreement because Charnis rented another car from Sixt in
10
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California in July 2019, that rental also falls within this putative class action because it
allegedly resulted in illegally imposed fees, and the California rental agreement contains
a provision delegating questions of contract formation to an arbitrator. Mot. to Compel 7,
8–10, 17–19 (DE [101]); Reply 4, 5–6 (DE [115]); see also Emery Decl. ¶¶ 4–5 (Sixt’s
counsel attesting that Plaintiff Calderon sought discovery in this suit concerning Charnis’s
California rental). The Court is unpersuaded by this argument. Aside from the delegation
argument just discussed, as Charnis points out, see Resp. in Opp’n 2 (DE [106]), nowhere
does the First Amended Complaint allege any facts about the California rental or the
contract governing that rental. At this stage—before the Court has decided whether to
certify any classes—any claim allegedly relating to Charnis’s unrelated California rental
is not at issue. Thus, the Court finds that only the Florida rental in November 2019 is at
issue, and Charnis’s claims in the First Amended Complaint stemming from that rental
are governed by the contracts Charnis entered into, if at all, when booking the reservation
online in California or picking up his rental in Florida.
C. Charnis Agreed to Arbitrate When He Booked the Online Reservation.
Sixt’s next argument is two-fold: (1) under California contract law, Charnis agreed
to arbitrate because he had an opportunity to review the online terms and conditions—
that is, the general Rental Jacket—before clicking “BOOK NOW” to book the reservation;
and (2) under Florida contract law, Charnis agreed to arbitrate because the Florida Rental
Jacket’s terms were incorporated into the Face Page, and Charnis had the opportunity to
review the Florida Rental Jacket before completing the transaction. In response, Charnis
challenges Boehringer’s ability to attest to matters that are not within his personal
knowledge, such as what Charnis clicked on when he booked the reservation or picked
up the car. Then, Charnis contends that the Face Page does not incorporate by reference
11
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the Rental Jacket under Florida law. The Court disagrees with Charnis’s first argument
and does not reach Charnis’s second argument. As discussed below, because the Court
finds that Charnis agreed to Sixt’s arbitration provision when he booked his online
reservation, the Court need not reach the question of whether the Face Page incorporates
by reference the Rental Jacket’s terms under Florida law.
A declaration “must be made on personal knowledge” and “set out facts that would
be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Charnis dedicates much of his
Response to arguing that Boehringer does not have sufficient personal knowledge
because he is not a website designer or an IT specialist and therefore cannot attest to
exactly how Sixt’s website looked and functioned on November 17, 2019, when Charnis
booked his online reservation.

See Resp. in Opp’n 4–9 (DE [106]).

The Court is

unpersuaded by this argument. Boehringer manages projects for Sixt and tests the
reservation process himself for those projects. 1st Boehringer Decl. ¶¶ 3–4 (DE [102]).
He personally made reservations on Sixt’s website on November 11 and 25, 2019—
around the same time as Charnis—and attests that the current website layout and
booking process is the same as it was back then. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7. The screenshot in
Boehringer’s declaration shows that, by clicking the “BOOK NOW” button to complete the
booking, customers confirm that they have read and accept the “terms and conditions.”
Id. ¶ 8. Clicking the “terms and conditions” hyperlink sends the customer to the general
“Terms and Conditions Rental Jacket,” a copy of which Boehringer attached to his
declaration; that version was in effect in November 2019 and contains an arbitration
provision. Id. ¶ 7; see also Ex. 1 to 1st Boehringer Decl. (DE [102-1], at 21).
Charnis does not adduce any counterevidence revealing a genuine factual issue;
his conclusory allegations in the First Amended Complaint that he did not agree to
12
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arbitrate, without more, are insufficient in light of Sixt’s evidence. See Deal v. Tugalo Gas
Co., 2021 WL 1049813, at *7 (11th Cir. Mar. 19, 2021) (stating that once the movant
satisfies its initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, then
“the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show evidence raising a genuine issue of material
fact” (citing Boyle v. City of Pell City, 866 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2017))); Bazemore,
827 F.3d at 1333 (“‘[C]onclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no
probative value’ for a party resisting summary judgment.” (quoting Leigh v. Warner Bros.,
212 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000))). For example, Charnis does not assert that the
layout of Sixt’s website was not as Boehringer described or that he did not actually click
the “BOOK NOW” button. Further, Charnis asserts—with no supporting legal authority—
that he did not enter into a binding contract when he booked the online reservation
because he did not pay for the rental at that time and it was “freely cancelable at his
discretion.” Resp. in Opp’n 2 (DE [106]).
But Sixt points to legal authority to the contrary. Under substantive California
contract law,3 “[m]utual manifestation of assent, whether by written or spoken word or by
conduct, is the touchstone of contract.” Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171,

Sixt argues that, under the principle of lex loci contractus, California law governs Charnis’s online
reservation of the Florida rental because Charnis accepted Sixt’s website’s terms and conditions from his
home in California when he booked the rental. See Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043,
1059 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Absent a specific contractual provision to the contrary, Florida conflict of law rules
dictate that courts should apply lex loci contractus, or the law of the state where the contract was made, to
questions of contracts (other than those that deal with contracts for the performance of services).” (citations
omitted)); Rimel v. Uber Techs., Inc., 2016 WL 6246812, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2016), report and
recommendation adopted, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1317 (M.D. Fla. 2017) (applying Florida law to Uber’s arbitration
provision under lex loci contractus because plaintiff resided and worked in Florida and “presumably” clicked
“Yes, I Agree” to the agreement on the Uber app while he was in Florida).
3

Charnis does not appear to dispute that California law applies to the online booking, though he does note
that Sixt’s website contains several different versions of general and state-specific terms and conditions.
See Resp. in Opp’n 15–16 (DE [106]). The Court agrees with Sixt that California law applies to the online
reservation.

13
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1175 (9th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp.,
306 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying California law)). California law requires the court
to “determine whether the outward manifestations of consent would lead a reasonable
person to believe the offeree has assented to the agreement.” Lee v. Ticketmaster L.L.C.,
817 F. App’x 393, 394 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 771 F.3d
559, 565 (9th Cir. 2014)); see also Babcock v. Neutron Holdings, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 3d
1222, 1229–30 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (“California contract law ‘measures assent by an
objective standard that takes into account both what the offeree . . . did and the
transactional context in which the offeree . . . acted.’” (omissions in original) (quoting
Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2017))).
But a party’s failure to read a contract’s terms before agreeing to them does not
relieve the party of its contractual obligations if the party had sufficient notice. See Norcia
v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., LLC, 845 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A party cannot
avoid the terms of a contract on the ground that he or she failed to read it before signing.”
(quoting Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc. v. Benco Contracting & Eng'g, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr.
2d 645 (Ct. App. 2001))); Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1175 (“While failure to read a contract
before agreeing to its terms does not relieve a party of its obligations under the contract,
the onus must be on website owners to put users on notice of the terms to which they
wish to bind consumers.” (internal citation omitted)).
The Court agrees with Sixt that its online booking process involves a modified or
hybrid clickwrap agreement. A pure clickwrap agreement is one “in which website users
are required to click on an ‘I agree’ box after being presented with a list of the terms and
conditions of use.” Lee, 817 F. App’x at 394 (quoting Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1175–76); see
also Babcock, 454 F. Supp. 3d at 1230 n.4 (describing different types of website
14

Case 0:19-cv-62408-AHS Document 127 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/09/2021 Page 15 of 18

agreements (quoting Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., 2016 WL 6476934, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 1,
2016))). The agreement in this case, however, is not a pure clickwrap agreement; it
included the Rental Jacket’s terms and conditions in the form of a hyperlink that would
direct Charnis to another page and did not expressly require Charnis to check a box
stating that he agreed to the displayed terms. Nevertheless, Charnis manifested his
assent by clicking the “BOOK NOW” button, which confirmed that he read and agreed to
the Rental Jacket’s terms and conditions, as displayed by the hyperlinked text in orange,
which stands out against the white background. See, e.g., Lee, 817 F. App’x at 394–95
(holding that, under the modified clickwrap agreement, plaintiff “validly assented” to
defendant’s arbitration provision when plaintiff clicked the “Place Order” button to
purchase tickets; directly above the button, the website stated, “By clicking ‘Place Order,’
you agree to our Terms of Use,” and “Terms of Use” was displayed in blue font and
contained a hyperlink to defendant’s terms).
Here, like in Lee, Sixt’s website contained an “explicit textual notice” that clicking
the “BOOK NOW” button would manifest Charnis’s intent to be bound by Sixt’s Rental
Jacket, including the arbitration provision. See id. (quoting Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177);
see, e.g., Van Den Heuvel v. Expedia Travel, 2017 WL 5133270, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6,
2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 6512945 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017)
(finding that “plaintiff manifested his clear agreement to the Expedia arbitration clause
when he selected the ‘complete booking’ button on the ‘Review and book your trip’ screen
during his ticket purchase process” on Expedia’s website); Swift v. Zynga Game Network,
Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 904, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that “she
was not provided with sufficient notice of the contractual terms she was assenting to”;
finding that plaintiff agreed to arbitration because she “was provided with an opportunity
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to review the terms of service in the form of a hyperlink immediately under the ‘I accept’
button and she admittedly clicked ‘Accept’”).
This case is also distinguishable from Bazemore v. Jefferson Capital Systems, on
which Charnis relies. See 827 F. App’x at 1330–32. There, the plaintiff applied online for
a credit card issued by the defendant bank. Id. at 1327. In support of its motion to compel
arbitration, the bank presented only the affidavit of an employee of another company,
Atlanticus, that maintained credit card records on the bank’s behalf. Id. Unlike in this
case, in Bazemore, there was no evidence that the website through which the plaintiff
applied for the credit card “displayed or referred to any terms or conditions of the credit
card she sought, much less that she was required to consent to any such terms in order
to obtain her credit card.” Id. at 1327–28. Instead, the Atlanticus employee attested that
a welcome kit containing the credit card agreement “would have been sent” to the plaintiff
and that the kit “would have” contained “a form of” the agreement attached to the
employee’s declaration. Id. at 1328. Notably, the Atlanticus employee did not even attest
that the agreement the plaintiff would have received contained an arbitration provision,
id., and the bank did not provide any evidence of the clickwrap agreement or the actual
contract it was seeking to enforce, id. at 1332. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit in Bazemore
concluded that the bank’s affidavit was “woefully inadequate,” id. at 1330, and held that
the bank’s motion to compel should have been denied as a matter of law because it
“offered no competent evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement,” id. at 1334. Such is
not the case here, where Sixt has come forth with evidence showing that Charnis had to
have agreed to Sixt’s terms and conditions—including the arbitration provision—before
booking the rental and has provided a copy of the actual Rental Jacket that Charnis
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agreed to.
D. The Court Must Delegate Arbitrability Questions to the Arbitrator.
Now—after having found that Charnis did, in fact, agree to the arbitration provision
in the Rental Jacket—the Court must turn back to the delegation provision in the
agreement to arbitrate.

As discussed above, the delegation provision requires an

arbitrator, not the Court, to “resolve any and all disputes relating to” the “interpretation”
and “applicability” of the “agreement.” Ex. 1 to 1st Boehringer Decl. (DE [102-1], at 21).
And another provision defines the “agreement” as the terms and conditions of the Rental
Jacket and the Face Page. Id. at 4. Thus, applying the delegation provision, this Court
leaves to an arbitrator the question of whether Charnis’s specific claims in this putative
class action fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement to which Charnis assented
by booking his rental on Sixt’s website. The Court will also stay litigation of Charnis’s
claims until arbitration is completed.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Under California law, Charnis manifested his assent to be bound by Sixt’s terms

and conditions in its Rental Jacket—including the arbitration provision—when he booked
his online reservation through Sixt’s website. Under the summary judgment-like standard
applied to a motion to compel arbitration, Sixt has adduced evidence showing that
Charnis agreed to the arbitration provision, and Charnis failed to come forth with any
counterevidence revealing a factual issue about whether he agreed to arbitrate. See
Deal, 2021 WL 1049813, at *7. Accordingly, no genuine dispute of material fact exists
about the formation of the arbitration agreement, and the Court concludes as a matter of
law that the parties agreed to arbitrate. See Mason, 815 F. App’x at 328 (quoting
Bazemore, 827 F.3d at 1333). The Court need not reach the question of whether, under
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Florida law, the Face Page incorporates by reference the Rental Jacket’s terms. It is
therefore
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Sixt’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay
Charnis’s Claims (DE [101]) is GRANTED, but Sixt’s request for a hearing is DENIED.
The arbitrator shall resolve any disputes about whether Charnis’s claims are subject to
arbitration, and Charnis’s claims in this action are STAYED. Charnis and Sixt shall file a
Joint Status Report advising the Court of the status of Charnis’s claims when arbitration
is completed.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 8th day of
April 2021.

Copies furnished to counsel via CM/ECF
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